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Abstract 
This study deals with industrial accidents and domino effects that may occur in an industrial plant, the initial accident being supposed to 
take place in any of the tanks either under or at atmospheric pressure. This initial sequence might generate sets of structural fragments, 
fire balls, blast waves as well as critical losses of containment (liquid and gas) that threaten the surrounding facilities and may cause 
serious damages.  The structural fragments, the blast wave and the fire ball can be described following database and feedback collected 
from past accidents. The vulnerability of the potential targeted tanks is investigated in order to assess the risk of propagation of the first 
sequence of industrial hazard. Cascading sequences of accidents, explosions and fires can take place, giving rise to the domino effect. 
This risk of domino effect occurrence is investigated herein. The interaction and the behavior of the targets affected or impacted by the 
first explosion effects are described by adequate simplified mechanical models: perforation and penetration of metal fragments when they 
impact surrounding tanks, as well as global failure such as overturning, buckling, excessive bending or shear effects, etc. Sensitivity 
analysis is performed thanks to Monte Carlo simulations: the probability of impact and risk of failure of target tanks are reported. A 
comparison between risks due to blast wave and fragments impacts is performed. 
 
© 2012 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility of the Beijing Institute of 
Technology. 
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1. Introduction 
The hazardous substances that are produced and stored in industrial plants can, under severe conditions, generate 
explosions, fires and fragmentations of the tanks and the pipelines. Actually, internal or external conditions can trigger an 
initial sequence of a severe accident that may propagate and affect or impact the tanks, pipelines, power lines and facilities 
erected within the industrial plant. Catastrophic consequences may then affect the whole plant and its neighborhood, i.e. 
important structural damages as well as human losses or severe injuries. 
Literature and past accidents reports show that industrial accidents may simultaneously give rise to blast waves, 
structural fragments generation and projection, fireballs producing thermal radiation or thermal flows as well as loss of 
confinement with ejection of potential flammable gases and liquids [1-4]. 
Modeling and analysis of the whole events and their specific effects (mechanical, thermal, chemical, etc) is still a 
complex scientific and multidisciplinary challenge [1; 5-13]: 
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 Triggering event: The probability of occurrence as well as the thermodynamic and mechanical conditions for the first 
accident is assessed according to adequate modelling that may rely on past accidents and existing databases. 
 Subsequent effects and propagation: generation and fragments ejection, blast wave and pressure front, fireballs and 
thermal flows, and confined products ejection (gases, liquids) as sub-events require mechanical modeling and adequate 
probabilistic description. 
 Effects on the surrounding facilities: adequate behavior and response of the affected targets are required, such as 
penetration or perforation of the fragments as well as the damages suffered by the targeted facilities (tanks, pipelines, etc). 
Indirect effects can also take place such as fire ignitions for instance. 
 Successive sequences of accidents: the sequences of sub-events taking place within the industrial plant are potential 
causes for domino effect initiation. Detailed analyses are then required. 
The domino effect generates disastrous situation with an expected cost that is derived according to its socio-economic 
consequences weighted by its occurrence probability. Optimization of the global generalized cost is helpful in designing the 
required protective measures that might be decided by the stakeholders in order to mitigate the potential disaster, and protect 
adequately the most sensitive and highly strategic installations.  
2. Domino effect and integrated probabilistic framework: theoretical considerations 
2.1. General case: set of tanks and domino effect sequences 
We consider the general case of an industrial plant containing several tanks under pressure or at atmospheric pressure, 
see Fig.1. A first accident or explosion can take place in any of these tanks, under a given set of internal or external causes, 
i.e.: 
 Internal causes: corrosion, weak welding, cracking, over pressure or critical temperature of the stored gas or liquid, etc. 
 External causes: malevolent acts, natural events such as strong quakes, tsunamis, explosions or impacts, fires and 
thermal effects, lightning, etc. 
Each tank, denoted as a Source “S” of industrial hazard, may explode and generate mechanical, chemical or thermal 
threats to the other tanks and facilities within the plant. These potential sources of industrial hazard are denoted S(i) with i= 
1 up to Ns, Ns being the number of tanks in the industrial plant. When an accident affects a given source S(i), it may generate 
one or various sub-events, i.e. : 
 Sets of structural fragments that become projectiles when ejected from the tank source, 
 A fire ball and thermal flows, 
 A blast wave, and 
 A loss of containment (gas and liquid losses). 
The event g1E  corresponding to any first accident has a probability of occurrence during any given reference period, TREF 
(expected plant lifetime, for instance) defined as: 
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Where: a, p= average yearly accident ratios for the source tanks, respectively, at atmospheric pressure (total number of 
such tanks= Na) or under pressure (total number of such tanks= Np). 
The propagation as industrial hazard threatening the other tanks and facilities has a probability of occurrence defined as: 
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The sub-events, i.e. structural projectiles, blast wave, thermal effects and containment loss, may cause damages to the 
targets erected in the vicinity of the sources. The probability of damages occurrence is defined as: 
g
1E
propa
1E
damage
1
damage
1 E.PE.PEP EP g
1
propa
1
                                                                 
(4) 
The targets may be seriously damaged and may give rise to a new sequence of accidents (explosions, fires, etc). For the 
general purpose, one could say that any sequence gnE , where n is the range of the accidents sequence (n 1), can give rise to 
an additional sequence (n+1), event g 1nE , with a probability of occurrence defined as: 
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(a)     (b)  
Fig. 1. Illustration of a generic industrial plant with (a) First accident sequence and its propagation (b) Detailed events. 
2.2. Decision making and domino effect mitigation 
The industrial accidents have in general several consequences of great importance, such as: 
 Socio-economic and employees’ jobs losses due to production interruption, reconstruction, repair or strengthening of the 
industrial plant, 
 Environmental consequences in case of containment losses such as liquids or gases, 
 Fires that threaten the whole plant as well as the surrounding buildings, facilities, installations, etc 
 Threats to the health and physical integrity of the employees and inhabitants in case of toxic products release, etc. 
 
In order to reduce or mitigate the disaster, one may consider either, see Fig.2: 
 reduction of the hazards and threats by isolating the sources of possible accidents, 
 reduction of the vulnerability of the potential targets by protective measures (better design, barriers and protections, 
erection of buildings, tanks and installations with large relative security distances), 
 regular inspections and severe security measures, etc. 
 protection against confinement losses such as containment and retention basins in case of petrol oil, for instance, 
 use of automatic protective systems such as shutdown systems, alarms, fire protection, etc. 
From a theoretical point of view, for any general configuration (industrial plant, surrounding buildings, facilities and 
other plants, strategic installations, operational headquarters, etc), the total expected cost of losses is, [14]: 
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where : gkC = socio-economic losses as consequences of the sequence k of the domino effect, k=1 up to the range n of 
sequences under study (until the total plant is destroyed or reaches a given threshold of destruction, glossesC = mathematical 
expected value of the socio-economic consequences on the whole industrial plant and its concerned vicinity. 
In order to mitigate the industrial disaster, the stockholders may decide to adopt several protective solutions in order to 
optimise the economic investments so that to reach the optimal global cost: 
n
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(7) 
where: goptC = optimal global cost of the entire zone (industrial plant and its affected surroundings), g0C = initial global cost 
before adopting any additional protective measures so that the initial risk of domino effect gEP k  is reduced by 
gEP k  
as consequence of the protective measures. 
In fact, this optimal global cost seems theoretically easy to be calculated. In fact, several aspects such as respect of 
human life, pollutions and aggressive products release, reactions of the public opinion and political decisions make this 
optimization not so easy to be reached in practice. However, this theoretical formulation may also be helpful in prospecting 
objective investments and accompanying measures (survey and early warning systems, automatic control and shutdowns, 
protective barriers, vicinity planning and organization) that result in risk reduction, disaster mitigation and satisfy resilience 
and quick recovery requirements. 
 
(a)
Confining barrier
Protective barriers
    (b)  
(c)                      (d)      
 
Fig. 2. Protective measures regarding potential sources or targets. 
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3. Applications and sensitivity analysis 
3.1. Risk of failure 
The present study considers the case of tanks with various filling levels. The present case is restricted to the analysis of 
the fragments impacts and the blast wave. For sake of simplicity, the thermal flows effects and the containment losses 
effects are not included in the present results.  
Monte Carlo simulations are used in order to evaluate the probability of impacts as well as the probability of failure. 
3.2. Structural fragments: Probability of impacts and risk of failure 
The probability of failure is obtained by Monte Carlo simulations as, [8-12; 14]: 
simN Stateof a t arg et 0
rup
k 1 sim
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With: 
State of a t arg et 0
1 if a t arg et is completely damaged
1 k
0 if not
                                                                 
(9) 
And: Nsim= total number of simulations. 
 
                                              Table 1. Probabilistic description of the structural fragments [8-9] 
Random variable Probability density function Probability density 
function formulas 
Comments and Details 
Number of fragments (n) Discrete exponential 
distribution  20 1 2( n n )
Np (n) e
0, 1 and 2 are 
multipliers of Lagrange 
obtained from the 
accidental data 
Relative frequency of any 
projectile form (fp) 
Uniform distribution by 
intervals 
fp - 
Projectile mass (mp) Uniform distribution mp = Vp x  Volume of fragments is a 
product of random 
variables and follows a 
uniform distribution. 
Projectile departure velocity 
(vp) 
Uniform distribution 
c
p
p
2E
v
m
 
 Ec = Eexp 
Velocity of projectiles 
depends from the kinetic 
energy transmitted to 
projectiles. Kinetic energy 
is a fraction of the 
explosion energy which 
can be represented by the 
ratio . This factor follows 
a uniform distribution. 
Horizontal departure angle 
() 
Uniform distribution by 
intervals 
  
Vertical departure angle ( ) Uniform distribution  with  arcsin ( ) 
following uniform 
distribution. 
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Furthermore, a uniform random variable, H, is considered in order to express the filling level of a source tank. Its values 
range within the interval[ 0; Hmax ], where Hmax is the maximal filling level of a tank. 
The trajectory of the fragments and their impact on target tanks are evaluated according to existing developments [8-9].  
3.3. Blast waves: Effects on target tanks and Risk of failure 
After an explosion, a blast wave moves through the air and in contact with surrounding tanks it can produce mechanical 
effects on affected tanks, resulting in: 
 Excessive bending, 
 Tank overturning, 
 Global buckling, 
 Tank sliding on the ground surface, and 
 Excessive shear and bending of the target anchors. 
3.4. Results and Comments 
For illustrative purposes, the source tank is cylindrical and pressurized, whereas the target tank is at atmospheric pressure, 
see Table 2. The source tank content is liquefied propane. Target tank is supposed without any liquefied content, full of 
evaporated gas-oxygen mixture. With this assumption, secondary effects due to liquid dynamic movement are intentionally 
neglected and, on the other side, a target tank is more prone to mechanical damage. 
                                              Table 2. Case study: source and target tanks definition 
Parameter Source tank Target tank 
Radius (R) 3.5 m 6 m 
Length (L) 15 m 12 m 
Capacity (V) 757 m3 1350 m3 
Shell thickness (e) 0.007 m 0.005 m 
Burst pressure (Pe) 800000 Pa - 
Ultimate stress ( u) 360 Gpa 360 Gpa 
Ultimate strain ( u) 0.23 0.23 
 
The target tank is located at a distance of 100 meters from the source tank. Considering the origin of coordinate system at 
the centre of source tank, the centre of the target tank is then located at (100m: horizontal distance, 0m, 6m: height). Table 3 
provides the results obtained from the simulations, i.e.: projectiles impacting the target, distribution of projectiles and 
distribution of projectiles kinetic energy at the impact on the ground for each angular sector, see Table 3 and Fig. 3. 
                                              Table 3. Properties of the structural fragments ejected as projectiles impacting the target 
Parameter Value 
Average speed at the impact 82.98 m/s 
Average kinetic energy at the impact 14.463 MJ 
Average mass of projectiles 8954 kg 
Ratio of end cups 9.09 % 
Ratio of elongated end cups 45.45 % 
Ratio of plates 45.45 % 
Pimp : Probability of the impact 5.5x10-3 
 
From the results of simulations for projectiles impact and overpressure wave impact on the atmospheric tank it is 
possible to compare levels of risk from each phenomena and for different levels of damage. It is found that overpressure 
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waves can produce significant damage at the near field. On the other hand, risk of projectiles impact is much lower at the 
near field but projectiles can trigger the domino effect at much higher distance. 
Fig. 4 shows that the probability of failure from the blast wave is 3 to 7 times greater than the probability of failure 
produced by projectiles. Also, in this model only massive projectiles are considered as the potential projectiles and small, 
light projectiles are intentionally neglected. 
 
 
Fig. 3. Distribution of projectiles: iso-values of probability of impact. 
 
Fig. 4. Iso-values of probability of failure: Probability of tank failure from the projectiles and the overpressure wave impact. 
4. Conclusions 
The domino effect is a cascading sequence of accidents and explosions, disseminating from an initial source to the 
surrounding tanks in an industrial plant. Under these successive sequences, the industrial plant and the facilities, 
constructions and also human beings are severely threatened and may be suffer important and irreversible losses. 
The study of this effect from the initial possible accident until the propagation within the plant requires multi-disciplinary 
approaches. The purpose of the present study if to provide a theoretical formulation that describes and evaluates the risk of 
occurrence of the triggering event, due to external or internal causes, the propagation effect as it may produce four sub-
events, mainly: fragments ejected as projectiles, blast waves, fire balls as well as loss of confinement. 
Probabilistic formulation is developed in order to describe the occurrence of the first event, as well as the probability of 
occurrence of the four sub-events. The interaction between the surrounding vessels and facilities and the mechanical as well 
as thermal effect of these sub-events may cause global or local damage as well as a possible fire ignition and explosion 
taking rise within the affected targets or their immediate vicinity such as pipelines and power lines, for instance. Mechanical, 
thermo-mechanical and also chemo-thermo-mechanical analyses are therefore required in order to quantify the resulting 
effect on the considered targets (tanks or power lines impacted, heated, blasted, etc). In the case of impact by structural 
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fragments for instance, penetration and perforation as well as interaction projectile-impacted tank need the use of adequate 
material and structural behaviours, performed in general by numeric simulations. 
This study provides the theoretical aspects that should be considered for a detailed analysis of the domino effect. Relying 
on these developments, numeric simulations can be performed and sensitivity analysis as well as critical scenarios can be 
studied. 
For the case study considered in this paper, it is found that overpressure waves can produce significant damage at the 
near field. On the other hand, risk of projectiles impact is much lower at the near field but projectiles can trigger the domino 
effect at much higher distance. Actually, the probability of failure from the blast wave is 3 to 7 times greater than the 
probability of failure produced by projectiles. Also, in this model only massive projectiles are considered as the potential 
projectiles and small, light projectiles are intentionally neglected. 
Relying on the expected numeric results, one may perform an optimisation of the generalised cost resulting from initial 
costs and expected socio-economic consequences. Adequate investments and protective options can then be objectively 
decided by the stakeholders in order to mitigate the potential disasters and aim a quick recovery. 
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